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A TALE OF TWO COUNTRIES: COMPARING 
THE LAW OF INHERITANCE IN TWO 
SEEMINGLY OPPOSITE SYSTEMS 
RAY D. MADOFF* 
Abstract: Although at first glance French and U.S. inheritance laws appear to 
be diametrically opposed, this paper provides a deeper analysis. In doing so, it 
explains that nuances within both systems have made the laws more similar 
than they initially appear. U.S. inheritance laws, explicitly characterized by 
freedom of testation, include numerous substantive limits on how a testator 
may dispose of her property at death. Courts often use doctrines such as men-
tal capacity, undue influence, and fraud to void wills that do not provide for 
the decedent’s children. Also, because over one half of all Americans die in-
testate, or without a will, children are provided for in this way as well. French 
inheritance laws, which on their face appear to require everyone to leave at 
least half of their property to their children, similarly allow for significant de-
viation from this rule. Some techniques, such as life insurance, tontines, and 
usufruct interests have been around for a while. Since 2006, however, the law 
has given French parents even greater ability to control the distribution of 
their estates. This paper examines French and U.S. inheritance law, with an 
eye towards these initial differences, and deeper similarities. 
I am surprised that ancient and modern jurists have not attributed to 
[the law of descent] a greater influence on human affairs. It is true that 
these laws belong to civil affairs; but they ought nevertheless to be 
placed at the head of all political institutions; for, whilst political laws 
are only the symbol of a nation’s condition, they exercise an incredible 
influence upon its social state. They have, moreover, a sure and uniform 
manner of operating upon society, affecting, as it were, generations yet 
unborn. 
—Alexis de Tocqueville 
Democracy in America (1835) 
INTRODUCTION 
The United States and France stand at polar extremes when it comes to 
inheritance law. The United States takes as its starting point the autonomy 
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of the individual and is characterized by the doctrine of freedom of testa-
tion.1 Freedom of testation gives people the ability to distribute their prop-
erty at death as they wish—even to the exclusion of their family members 
and even if the decedent’s children become wards of the state as a result of 
the disinheritance.2 
In contrast to the United States, French inheritance law takes as its 
starting point the obligation towards family, and imposes strict limitations 
on individuals’ freedom of testation.3 French law is characterized by the 
heirs’ rights to the réserve héréditaire.4 Under this law, children are entitled 
to receive between one-half and three-quarters of their parents’ property.5 
Individuals can only control the remaining portion of their estates, which 
can be as little as one-quarter.6 Moreover, the réserve héréditaire cannot be 
avoided by making lifetime gifts, as the rights to the réserve héréditaire 
extend to property transferred by the decedent during life.7 
At first glance, nothing could be more different than the inheritance 
law of France and the United States. But, nothing is as simple as it first ap-
pears. Closer inspection of laws and practices in the United States shows 
that testators are subject to restraints that result in far greater protections for 
family members than the rhetoric of freedom of testation would suggest. In 
addition, French law—particularly after 2006—leaves heirs far more vul-
nerable to the wishes of testators than the rhetoric surrounding the réserve 
héréditaire would suggest. Nonetheless, despite this seeming convergence, 
significant differences remain between the two systems. This essay explores 
these differences and similarities. 
This essay will examine the following topics: (1) freedom of testation 
under U.S. inheritance law; (2) protection for heirs under French inheritance 
law; (3) unexpected protection for heirs under U.S. inheritance law; (4) ex-
panded freedom of testation under French inheritance law; and (5) conclud-
ing thoughts on convergence and continued differences. 
                                                                                                                           
 1 RAY D. MADOFF, IMMORTALITY AND THE LAW: THE RISING POWER OF THE AMERICAN 
DEAD 57–58 (2010) [hereinafter IMMORTALITY AND THE LAW]. 
 2 Id. 
 3 See Joelle Godard, Reform of the Law of Succession in France, in INTERNATIONAL FAMILY 
LAW 50, 53 (2007). 
 4 CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 913 (Fr.). 
 5 Id. 
 6 Id.; Godard, supra note 3, at 51. 
 7 C. CIV. arts. 920–924 (Fr.). 
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INHERITANCE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES: FREEDOM OF TESTATION 
Inheritance law in the United States is characterized by the principle of 
freedom of testation: the unlimited right of a person to dispose of her prop-
erty however she chooses.8 This right to control the disposition of property 
at death is central to the American psyche. While people are often vague in 
their understanding about many aspects of the law, one thing that is often 
clear in their minds is the right to write a will that controls who will—and 
who will not—get their property after they die.9 
The effect of this ability to control property after death, and the power 
it conveys to the property owner, is a theme that has been frequently ex-
plored in the American arts. Whether it is Tennessee Williams’ “Cat on a 
Hot Tin Roof” or Rodney Dangerfield’s “Easy Money,” Americans easily 
recognize the image of would-be heirs currying favor with the future dead 
in order to secure an inheritance. In this way, property owners can control 
much more than just their property. Through their right to control the dispo-
sition of property at death, they can control the behavior of others during 
their lives. After all, is there any doubt that many May-December unions—
marriages between young women and much older husbands—would likely 
not occur if “December” did not have the power to transmit wealth to 
“May” at the end of the day? 
Freedom of testation has produced another trope as well, namely the 
surprise ending in which the protagonist ends up disappointing his (often 
unappealing) family by writing a will very different from the one they ex-
pected. The movie “Gran Torino” provides one recent example of this 
“Passed Over Inheritance” trope, when Clint Eastwood surprises everyone 
by disinheriting his family in favor of the Hmong family next door.10 These 
tropes would not be possible but for freedom of testation. 
This ability to control property at death is instantiated in the rules gov-
erning inheritance in a variety of ways. First, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled 
as a constitutional matter that the right to transmit property at death is an 
essential right in the “bundle of sticks” we call property rights.11 
Second, courts have regularly ruled that children do not have a right to 
inherit property. As one court described it: 
                                                                                                                           
 8 IMMORTALITY AND THE LAW, supra note 1, at 58. The ideas in this section were explored 
by the author in greater detail in IMMORTALITY AND THE LAW, supra note 1. 
 9 Id. at 59. 
 10 See Gran Torino (Village Roadshow Pictures 2008); Passed Over Inheritances, TVTROPES.
ORG, http://tvtropes.org/pmwiki/pmwiki.php/Main/PassedOverInheritance (last visited Mar. 2, 2014) 
(providing other examples of this trope). 
 11 Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 716 (1987). 
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Basically, the right to receive property by will is a creature of the 
law, and is not a natural right or one guaranteed or protected by 
either the Ohio or the United States constitution. It is a fundamen-
tal rule of law in Ohio that a testator may legally entirely disin-
herit his children.12 
Ohio is not alone in this view. There are no state or federal laws pro-
tecting adult children against disinheritance.13 Moreover, in forty-nine of 
the fifty states (the exception being Louisiana), testators have broad latitude 
to disinherit their minor and dependent children, even if the effect of this 
disinheritance is that the children become wards of the state.14 
This focus on freedom of testation can partially be explained by the 
fact that the United States (with the exception of Louisiana) is largely a 
common law country. The common law has as its starting point that proper-
ty is owned by individuals (traditionally men) and that families have very 
little claim to the husband/father’s property.15 Common law countries differ 
from civil law countries (like France) because civil law countries view 
property as something that is owned by a family unit—as opposed to an 
individual.16 As a result, individuals are limited in their ability to convey 
property away from the family unit. 
Nonetheless, the fact that the United States is a common law country 
does not tell the whole story, since most of the common law countries other 
than the United States have modified their laws to provide greater protec-
tions for families by enacting family maintenance statutes.17 These statutes 
permit family members and other dependents to petition the court to receive 
more than was provided for them under the testator’s will.18 
Thus, in civil and common law countries throughout the world, chil-
dren are protected against disinheritance by their parent, either by being 
provided a fixed share of the parent’s estate (through forced succession 
                                                                                                                           
 12 Shapira v. Union Nat’l Bank, 315 N.E.2d 825, 828 (Ohio Misc. 1974) (citations omitted). 
 13 See IMMORTALITY AND THE LAW, supra note 1, at 58. 
 14 See id. at 167 & n.12. 
 15 Id. at 59. 
 16 THOMAS GLYN WATKIN, AN HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO MODERN CIVIL LAW 192–
218 (1999). 
 17 IMMORTALITY AND THE LAW, supra note 1, at 59. 
 18 Family maintenance statutes were first enacted in New Zealand in 1900. Testator’s Family 
Maintenance Act of 1900 (N.Z.). This served as the basis for the current testate succession laws in 
Australia, several of the Canadian provinces, and England. Ralph C. Brashier, Disinheritance and 
the Modern Family, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 83, 121 n.25 (1994). England adopted their first 
family maintenance statute in 1938. Inheritance (Family Provision) Act, 1938, 1 & 2 Geo. 6, c. 45 
(Eng.). For a detailed discussion of the law of England, see ALEXANDRA MASON & MARIAN 
CONROY, SPENCER MAURICE’S FAMILY PROVISION ON DEATH (7th ed. 1994). 
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statutes) or by being given the right to make an equitable claim against the 
decedent’s estate (through family maintenance statutes). In the United 
States, however, a disinherited child is largely left without recourse. 
The ability to disinherit minor children is particularly surprising in 
light of the fact that virtually every state imposes an obligation on parents to 
support their minor children during life.19 It is also ironic that that although 
parents can disinherit their minor and dependent children, these children 
cannot generally disinherit their parents due to the fact that they do not have 
the capacity to make a will.20 Moreover, in a majority of American jurisdic-
tions, a parent who fails to support his child during life can nonetheless in-
herit from the child in the event of the child’s death.21 
Although disinheritance of minor children is usually not a problem for 
the child who lives with both parents, it can be a significant problem for 
children with a non-custodial parent. This is particularly likely to be a prob-
lem when the non-custodial parent has remarried and formed a new family. 
Children of divorce are not the only ones who are likely to be disinher-
ited—non-marital children are also susceptible to this fate. Non-marital 
children have reached epidemic proportions as over 40 percent of all chil-
dren born in the United States are born out of wedlock.22 When a paternity 
action is brought against the putative father of a nonmarital child, he will 
often dispute the claim. If the claim is proven and support is ordered, the 
father may view the child merely as an unwanted source of debt. Unlike 
other creditors, who cannot be written off or “disinherited” by a will, the 
disinheritance of his child is perfectly permissible.23 
Louisiana is the only state in the United States that provides statutory 
protection for children in the form of “forced heirship.”24 The Louisiana 
                                                                                                                           
 19 See Ralph C. Brashier, Protecting the Child from Disinheritance: Must Louisiana Stand 
Alone? 57 LA. L. REV. 1, 6 & n.23 (1996) (providing an extensive list of state statutes that require 
able parents to support minor children during life). 
 20 See IMMORTALITY AND THE LAW, supra note 1, at 60. 
 21 Paula A. Monopoli, Deadbeat Dads: Should Support and Inheritance Be Linked?, 49 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 257, 259–60 (1994). There are generally two situations in which parents can inher-
it significant assets from their children. The first is when a child has no assets during life, but on 
death his estate has value as a result of a wrongful death claim. The second situation is when a 
child accumulates substantial earnings or receives a large personal injury or wrongful death award 
during the child’s lifetime (typically for a parent’s death). Id. at 265. 
 22 Unmarried Childbearing, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.
gov/nchs/fastats/unmarry.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2014). 
 23 Brashier, supra note 19, at 11. 
 24 IMMORTALITY AND THE LAW, supra note 1, at 61. Texas is the only other state that has 
ever tried forced heirship, a remnant of the state’s Spanish law history. After Texas entered the 
Union in 1846, the common law influence in this area became stronger and more expansive. Texas 
abolished forced heirship altogether in 1856. See Joseph Dainow, The Early Sources of Forced 
Heirship: Its History in Texas and Louisiana, 4 LA. L. REV. 42, 56–57 (1941). 
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forced heirship statute protects children against disinheritance by securing 
for them a minimum share (ranging between one-quarter and one-half) of 
the decedent’s estate.25 The statutory system of forced heirship protects the 
children of a testator from disinheritance unless they do something to “de-
serve” disinheritance.26 
Even in Louisiana, the trend has been moving away from family pro-
tection and towards individual rights to control one’s own property after 
death. Prior to 1989, the Louisiana forced heirship statute applied to all 
children, regardless of their age.27 In 1989, the Louisiana legislature 
changed the forced heirship provisions by limiting the class of children who 
can make a claim as forced heirs.28 The legislature limited the class of 
forced heirs to only children under the age of twenty-three, or children who 
were unable to care for themselves because of mental incapacity or physical 
infirmity.29 These changes were widely perceived as effectively ending 
forced heirship in Louisiana.30 Since then, Louisiana has further limited its 
protections for minor and disabled children, and no other state has enacted 
provisions for the protection of children.31 
Many scholars have criticized the American rule allowing disinher-
itance of children. They have also suggested different ways to reform the 
American system. Some have suggested that states adopt forced heirship 
statutes, similar to the rules that exist in France and other civil law coun-
tries. Others have suggested that states adopt family maintenance statutes, 
similar to those adopted in England and other common law countries. Final-
ly, some have suggested extending the support obligation for minor children 
                                                                                                                           
 25 See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 1493–1494 (1987); Mary Ann Glendon, Family Law Reform 
in the 1980’s, 44 LA. L. REV. 1553, 1570–73 (1984). 
 26 See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1494 (1987) (providing that donor may disinherit heirs for 
just cause). 
 27 IMMORTALITY AND THE LAW, supra note 1, at 62. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. 
 30 See generally Katherine S. Spaht et al., The New Forced Heirship Legislation: A Regretta-
ble “Revolution,” 50 LA. L. REV. 409 (1990) (exploring the changes to forced heirship in Louisi-
ana). 
 31 IMMORTALITY AND THE LAW, supra note 1, at 62. There were some bumps on the road in 
the elimination of forced heirship because after it was repealed by legislature, the Louisiana Su-
preme Court declared the repeal to be unconstitutional under their state constitution in 1993. The 
court’s holding of unconstitutionality was announced in the companion cases of Succession of 
Lauga, 624 So. 2d 1156, 1157 (La. 1993) and Succession of Terry, 624 So. 2d 1201, 1202 (La. 
1993). Louisiana subsequently amended its constitution to allow for the limitation of forced heir-
ship and the statutory provision was re-enacted in 1996. LA. CONST. art. XII, § 5; LA. CIV. CODE 
ANN. arts. 1493, 1495, 1496 (1996). 
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to include the obligation to support children at death.32 Yet, these sugges-
tions have largely fallen on deaf ears. To date, no new jurisdiction has add-
ed statutory protections against disinheritance for children, and the one state 
that provides such protections, Louisiana, has recently cut back on the pro-
tections provided for its children by limiting its protections to minor and 
disabled children.33 
The availability of the common law trust affords American testators an 
additional level of testamentary control. A trust is a device for holding 
property that allows the creator to establish continuing conditions on the 
distribution of property. This enables individuals to posthumously control 
the behavior of others through the use of conditional trusts. Courts have 
consistently enforced these trusts on the theory that since the beneficiaries 
could have been disinherited entirely, they cannot complain about having 
conditions imposed on their bequests. As one court described it: 
It must be borne in mind in all such instances that the legacies 
and devises were acts of bounty merely. The testator was free to 
withhold them altogether, or to subject them to conditions, 
whether sensible or futile. The gift is to be taken as made or not at 
all.34 
The only limitations that courts put on these conditions is that they cannot 
be “illegal” or “against public policy.”35 
The restriction against illegal conditions means that, presumably, a 
court would not enforce a provision that said that the beneficiary was obli-
gated to kill the testator’s former boss in order to receive his inheritance. 
While the rule against illegal conditions is often cited by courts and is a fa-
vorite of law professors, it is rarely applied, as there are no actual cases on 
record involving illegal conditions. 36 
Thus, the only relevant restriction on conditional bequests is that a 
court will not enforce a condition that is “against public policy.” Theoreti-
cally, this public policy exception could severely restrict conditional be-
quests, as the term is extremely malleable. In practice, this has not proven to 
                                                                                                                           
 32 See generally Brashier, supra note 19 (exploring the lack of protection from disinheritance 
for minor children throughout the United States); Ronald Chester, Disinheritance and the Ameri-
can Child: An Alternative from British Columbia, 1998 UTAH L. REV. 1 (arguing that the lack of 
protection from disinheritance for minor children is bad for the family and bad for society). 
 33 IMMORTALITY AND THE LAW, supra note 1, at 62. 
 34 In re Folsom’s Will, 155 N.Y.S. 2d 140, 146–47 (Sur. Ct. 1956) (quoting In re Lesser’s 
Estate, 287 N.Y.S. 209, 215 (Sur. Ct. 1936)). 
 35 See Shapira v. Union Nat’l Bank, 315 N.E.2d 825, 828–29 (Ohio Misc. 1974). 
 36 Jeffrey G. Sherman, Posthumous Meddling: An Instrumental Theory of Testamentary Re-
straints on Conjugal and Religious Choices, 99 U. ILL. L. REV. 1273, 1280 & n.34 (1999). 
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be much of a limitation, as American courts have generally been loath to 
use their authority to restrict these conditions, seeing it as outside their bail-
iwick. As one court described it: 
[A] testator has the right to grant bequests subject to any lawful 
conditions he or she may select. Beneficiaries of a testamentary 
instrument have no right to testamentary bequests except subject 
to the testator’s conditions, and it is generally not the role of the 
court to rearrange those bequests or conditions in keeping with 
the court’s sense of justice.37 
One area in which people often seek to impose conditions is marriage. 
Although the right to marry is constitutionally protected, courts have con-
sistently upheld bequests conditioned on either forbidding the beneficiary 
from marrying or requiring the beneficiary to marry someone of a particular 
group, on the theory that these provisions do not restrict the beneficiary’s 
right to marriage, they only restrict the beneficiary’s right to inherit.38 
Courts have been particularly understanding of husbands conditioning 
their wives’ inheritance on remaining unmarried after their husband’s death. 
As one court saw it: 
It would be extremely difficult to say, why a husband should not 
be at liberty to leave a homestead to his wife, without being com-
pelled to let her share it with a successor to his bed, and to use it 
to hatch a brood of strangers to his blood.39 
When it comes to children, testators have been more interested in re-
quiring them to marry someone of a particular religion or background, and 
courts have generally been supportive of these controls as well. Thus, in one 
case, in order to inherit his share of his father’s estate, the son was required 
to marry “a Jewish girl whose both parents were Jewish” within seven years 
of his father’s death.40 In another case, the testator’s daughter was required 
to marry a “man of true Greek blood and descent and of Orthodox religion” 
before receiving her inheritance.41 
                                                                                                                           
 37 Tunstall v. Wells, 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 468, 565 (Ct. App. 2006). 
 38 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); see Shapira, 315 N.E.2d at 831–32. 
 39 Commonwealth v. Stauffer, 10 Pa. 350, 355 (1849). Although courts also support wives 
conditioning their husband’s bequest on the husband not remarrying, the opportunity for women to 
impose these conditions is far more limited since women historically control far less property than 
their husbands and also tend to live longer than their husbands. IMMORTALITY AND THE LAW, 
supra note 1, at 74 & n.59. 
 40 Shapira, 315 N.E.2d at 826. 
 41 In re Estate of Keffalas, 233 A.2d 248, 250 (Pa. 1967). 
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Sometimes a testator is not just interested in preventing or requiring a 
new marriage, but is instead interested in ending an existing marriage. The 
official position of courts is that conditions designed to encourage divorce 
are against public policy, and accordingly courts have refused to enforce 
these conditions in several cases.42 This rule, however, is easy to circumvent 
because although courts will not enforce conditional bequests where the 
testator intended to encourage divorce, they will enforce such conditions if 
the testator intended to provide support in the event of divorce. As one court 
described it: 
A condition to a devise, the tendency of which is to encourage di-
vorce or bring about separation of husband and wife, is against 
public policy, and void. However, if the dominant motive of the 
testator is to provide support in the event of such separation or di-
vorce, the condition is valid.43 
Another surprising area where testators have been permitted to exert 
control is over the beneficiaries’ practice of religion. Freedom of religion is 
one of the cornerstones of the U.S. Constitution. Yet, courts have consistent-
ly upheld bequests conditioned on the beneficiary either practicing or re-
fraining from practicing a particular religion. For example, in one case a 
woman was entitled to receive income from the trust only “so long as she 
live up to and observes and follows the teachings and faith of the Roman 
Catholic Church.”44 Another testator required his grandchildren to remain 
“members in good standing of the Presbyterian Church.”45 Yet another tes-
tator conditioned his son’s inheritance on attending “regular meetings of 
worship of the Emmanuel Church near the village of Cashton, Wisconsin, 
when not sick in bed or prevented by accident or other unavoidable occur-
rence.”46 
These conditional bequests may be tolerated more in a culture that val-
ues religion, such as the United States, which subscribes to the theory that 
encouraging people to be more religious is not against public policy. This 
justification, however, does not explain why courts also regularly allow 
                                                                                                                           
 42 IMMORTALITY AND THE LAW, supra note 1, at 74. For example, in the Keffalas case requir-
ing the children to marry spouses “of true Greek blood and descent and of Orthodox religion,” the 
court refused to apply the limitation to those children who were already married to other spouses 
and would therefore have been required to divorce and remarry someone of the appropriate back-
ground in order to inherit. Keffalas, 233 A.2d at 250. 
 43 Hall v. Eaton, 631 N.E.2d 805, 807–08 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994). 
 44 Del. Trust Co. v. Fitzmaurice, 31 A.2d 383, 386 (Del. Ch. 1943); aff’d in part and rev’d in 
part on other grounds sub nom, Crumlish v. Del. Trust Co., 38 A.2d 463 (Del. Super. Ct. 1944). 
 45 In re Lanning’s Estate, 339 A.2d 520, 521 (Pa. 1975). 
 46 In re Paulson’s Will, 107 N.W. 484, 486 (Wis. 1906). 
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conditional bequests that require the beneficiary to refrain from practicing a 
particular religion. In one case the testator’s daughter only received her in-
heritance if, at the age of thirty-two, she proved conclusively that “she has 
not embraced, nor become a member of, the Catholic faith nor ever married 
a man of such faith.”47 
The power of conditional trusts has expanded in recent years as many 
states have moved to repeal rules imposing time limitations on private 
trusts.48 For years, most private trusts were limited in term by their state 
rule against perpetuities.49 This rule limited the duration of most private 
trusts to approximately 90 years.50 To facilitate the avoidance of federal es-
tate taxes, and in the process bring in money to their local banks, many 
states have repealed their rule against perpetuities. The repeal of the rule 
against perpetuities has allowed testators to impose conditions not just on 
their children, but also an unlimited number of generations to come. 
INHERITANCE LAW IN FRANCE: PROTECTION FOR HEIRS 
The inheritance law of France is in many ways diametrically opposed 
to that of the United States. Whereas the starting point for inheritance law in 
the United States is the donor’s freedom of testation—granting virtually 
unlimited rights of a decedent to transfer property at death as he or she sees 
fit, the starting point in French law is the heir’s rights to the réserve hé-
réditaire—the minimum share of a decedent’s estate to which the heirs are 
entitled. This share is “réservée”—reserved—to these persons. The réserve 
héréditaire is defined in opposition to the quotité disponible, the “disposa-
ble portion,” which is the share of the estate that each person can freely 
control at death. Depending upon the existence of other heirs, the quotité 
disponible can be as little as one-quarter of the decedent’s estate.51 
The réserve does not just limit transfers at death, but also applies to 
transfers made during life. Under French inheritance law, all lifetime gifts 
                                                                                                                           
 47 E. LeFevre, Annotation, Validity of Provisions of Will or Deed Prohibiting, Penalizing, or 
Requiring Marriage to One of a Particular Religious Faith, 50 A.L.R.2d 740, § 2 (1956) (citing 
U. S. Nat’l Bank of Portland v. Snodgrass, 275 P.2d 860 (Or. 1954)). 
 48 See IMMORTALITY AND THE LAW, supra note 1, at 72–85. 
 49 Id. at 76. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Ray D. Madoff & Pierre-Alain Conil, Inheritance and Death: Legal Strategies in the Unit-
ed States, England, and France, in THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF FAMILY LAW AND PRACTICE 
(forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 164, 183–84). The author thanks notaire (and former student) 
Pierre-Alain Conil for his assistance in understanding French law of inheritance and commends 
his excellent article on this subject: Pierre-Alain Conil, La Mise en Parallèle des Systèmes Succes-
soraux Français et Américain.-Une Tentative D’aller Au-delà des Mythes, n.2 DROIT DE LA FA-
MILLE 9 (Feb. 2013)(Fr.). 
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are taken into account at the time of death in calculating the heir’s réserve 
héréditaire.52 The notary in charge of the inheritance case will calculate a 
fictive estate—the masse de calcul53—that represents the amount of proper-
ty that the decedent would have owned if he hadn’t made any lifetime gifts. 
If, at his death, the héritiers réservataires (the forced heirs) don’t receive 
the share of the estate reserved for them by the law, the heirs are allowed to 
initiate a lawsuit against the persons or organizations who received gifts 
from the decedent in order to retrieve the amount necessary to satisfy the 
heirs’ legal share.54 
The amount of the reserve héréditaire depends upon the particular 
family situation of the decedent, in particular, the existence of children and 
spouses. If the decedent has no descendants and no spouse, then the dece-
dent is free to dispose of his entire estate as he chooses.55 But, before 2006, 
parents were also forced heirs, and were thus entitled to one-half of the de-
cedent’s estate in the event that the decedent died without children.56 
Under current law, the decedent’s only forced heirs are her children, 
and, only if there are no children, the decedent’s spouse. The amount that 
each child is entitled to receive in her reserve héréditaire depends on the 
number of children.57 If the decedent has one surviving child, the réserve is 
one-half of the estate and the quotité disponible is the other half . If the de-
cedent has two children, each child is entitled to receive one-third of the 
decedent’s estate (for a total of two-thirds) and the quotité disponible is the 
remaining one-third. If the decedent has three or more children, the children 
are entitled to divide the réserve héréditaire of three-quarters of the dece-
dent’s estate and the quotité disponible is the remaining one-quarter share. 
In determining a child’s share, French law used to distinguish between 
children born of the marriage and those born outside of a marriage, and 
those in the latter category received only half the share of a child born of 
the marriage. After the European Court of Human Rights held that there 
was no justification for discrimination against a child based on the marital 
status of the parents, the French rule was modified to treat all children the 
same, regardless of the marital status of the parents. 58 
                                                                                                                           
 52 C. CIV. art. 922 (Fr.). 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. arts. 921, 924. 
 55 Id. art. 916. 
 56 Godard, supra note 3, at 51. 
 57 C. CIV. art. 913 (Fr.). 
 58 Id. art. 733; Mazurek v. France, 2000-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 23, 39, available at http://www.
echr.coe.int/Documents/Reports_Recueil_2000-II.pdf. 
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The second category of forced heirs is spouses. Prior to 2001 spouses 
were not entitled to any protection under the réserve héréditaire.59 Even 
today, the surviving spouse is only entitled to a réserve héréditaire if there 
are no children of the decedent.60 If the decedent has no children, but is sur-
vived by a spouse, the spouse is entitled to one-quarter of the decedent’s 
estate and the decedent is able to control the remaining three-quarters of his 
estate.61 Regardless of whether the surviving spouse is entitled to a réserve 
héréditaire, all spouses are also protected under community property rules 
that entitle each spouse to one-half of all property earned by either spouse 
during the marriage.62 
Despite these minor changes, the French law of succession has shown 
remarkable stability since it was first officially established in the 1804 Na-
poleonic Code. It was recently pointed out in the French Senate that one of 
the paradoxes of the French Nation is that over the last two centuries one 
can count fourteen different Constitutions, but the main principles of suc-
cession law have remained unchanged.63 
UNEXPECTED PROTECTION FOR HEIRS UNDER UNITED STATES 
INHERITANCE LAW 
Despite broad language supporting freedom of testation in the United 
States, in practice and in law, heirs are provided greater protections (and 
testators are subject to greater restraints) than a superficial inquiry might 
suggest. 
Although the guiding principle of American inheritance law is freedom 
of testation, the vast majority of Americans—estimated at over one half of 
Americans in 2009—forego freedom of testation and instead have their 
property disposed of under state intestacy statutes.64 Intestacy statutes allo-
cate the decedent’s estate among family members, giving a set share to a 
spouse and dividing the rest evenly among the decedent’s children. Alt-
hough no one can be sure of the reasons why so many people forego writing 
                                                                                                                           
 59 Madoff & Conil, supra note 51 (manuscript at 183). 
 60 C. CIV. art. 914-1 (Fr.). 
 61 Id. In the 2001 reform, spouses were granted a forced share of ¼ in absence of descendants 
and ascendants. Godard, supra note 3, at 51. At that time, ascendants were forced heirs for ¼ each. 
Id. The 2006 law took away from the parents the quality of forced heirs and improved the protec-
tion of the surviving spouse by making him réservataire for ¼ when the decedent leaves no chil-
dren, even if the parents are still alive. Id. 
 62 See C. CIV. arts. 1400–1491 (Fr.). 
 63 Godard, supra note 3, at 50. 
 64 JESSE DUKEMINIER & ROBERT H. SITKOFF, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 63–69 (9th ed. 
2013). 
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wills, scholars have suggested fear of confronting one’s own mortality65 and 
the perceived time and cost involved in seeing a lawyer to write a will 
might contribute to the general unwillingness to write a will.66 Regardless 
of the reason, the effect of the vast majority of Americans dying intestate is 
that they distribute their property to family members under a state pre-
scribed plan of distribution. 
More importantly, where testators deviate from distributing property to 
their families, the law often steps in to void the will. In The Myth of Testa-
mentary Freedom, Professor Melanie Leslie examined case law over a five-
year period that concerned the validity of wills.67 Professor Leslie looked at 
cases involving both doctrines of intent (including mental capacity and un-
due influence) and formal requirements for writing wills (such as the re-
quirement of a signature or witnesses).68 What she found is that despite the 
rhetoric in favor of testamentary freedom, this freedom was largely a myth 
due to the fact that courts are interested in assuring that testators devise 
their estates in accordance with prevailing norms, in most cases meaning to 
the testator’s family. 
A careful review of case law, however, reveals that many courts 
do not exalt testamentary freedom above all other principles. 
Notwithstanding frequent declarations to the contrary, many 
courts are as committed to ensuring that testators devise their es-
tates in accordance with prevailing normative views as they are to 
effectuating testamentary intent . . . . Courts impose and enforce 
this moral duty to family through the covert manipulation of doc-
trine. To begin with, courts faced with an offensive will often use 
other doctrines ostensibly designed to ascertain whether the testa-
tor formulated testamentary intent—doctrines such as capacity, 
undue influence and fraud—to frustrate the testator’s intent and 
distribute estate assets to family members. Moreover, this tenden-
cy to protect family members is evident in many cases that pur-
port to determine only whether requisite will formalities have 
been met. Notwithstanding reformers’ claims that courts always 
insist on strict compliance with will formalities, courts throughout 
this century often have accepted less than strict compliance when 
                                                                                                                           
 65 Michael R. McCunney & Alyssa A. DiRusso, Marketing Wills, 16 ELDER L.J. 33, 35 
(2008); see also JEAN KOPPEN, AARP, THOUGHTS ON THE AFTERLIFE AMONG U.S. ADULTS 50+ 
(2007), available at http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/general/afterlife.pdf. 
 66 See McCunney & DiRusso, supra note 65, at 35, 59–60. 
 67 Melanie B. Leslie, The Myth of Testamentary Freedom, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 235, 236 (1996). 
 68 Id. at 236–37. 
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necessary to ensure fulfillment of a testator’s moral duty. Con-
versely, courts are more likely to require strict compliance when a 
will’s provisions can be viewed as a breach of that duty. At the 
end of the day, testamentary freedom exists for the vast majority 
of testators who happen to have the same sense of duty and moral 
obligation that the law implicitly imposes—but often not for 
those who hold non-conforming values.69 
Moreover, this preference for family is often built right into the fabric 
of the doctrines purportedly designed to protect testator intent. In Unmask-
ing Undue Influence, the author deconstructs the “undue influence” doctrine 
to illustrate how preference for biological family members is not a result of 
court’s misapplying the undue influence doctrine, but rather is a result of the 
correct application of the doctrine.70 One can see a sign of this direct link 
between family protection and the undue influence doctrine in the history of 
Louisiana’s law regarding family protection. When Louisiana had a statute 
that explicitly protected family members, it did not recognize capitation 
(another term for undue influence) as a cause of action against a will.71 
When the state cut back its family protection provisions, it brought back the 
claim of undue influence.72 
Finally, in recent years some courts have begun to limit conditional 
bequests. For the first time, a court ruled that a provision in a will disinher-
iting grandchildren who married non-Jews was void because it was against 
public policy.73 Although this decision was overturned on appeal, it is pos-
sible that later cases will pick up the reasoning of the lower court, particu-
larly since this position was included in the latest version of the Restate-
ment (Third) of Trusts (the Restatement).74 According to the Restatement, 
trust provisions are contrary to public policy (and therefore potentially inva-
lid) if they restrain beneficiary behavior, and provisions restrain beneficiary 
behavior if they influence who the beneficiary can marry, what religion the 
beneficiary can or cannot practice, or which career the beneficiary can 
                                                                                                                           
 69 Id. 
 70 See generally Ray D. Madoff, Unmasking Undue Influence, 81 MINN. L. REV. 571 (1997) 
(exploring the application of the undue influence doctrine). 
 71 Id. at 618–19. 
 72 Id. 
 73 In re Estate of Feinberg, 891 N.E. 2d 549, 555 (Ill. App. 2008), rev’d by In re Estate of 
Feinberg, 919 N.E. 2d 888, (Ill. 2009). 
 74 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) TRUSTS § 29 (2003); DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 64, at 
14. 
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choose.75 The Restatement, however, also calls for balancing of conflicting 
social values.76 
EXPANDED FREEDOM OF TESTATION UNDER FRENCH INHERITANCE LAW 
Just as American law provides far greater protection for family mem-
bers than the reverence for freedom of testation suggests, French law pro-
vides less protection for heirs than the system of the réserve héréditaire ini-
tially suggests. Freedom of testation in France has become even more pro-
nounced since the enactment of the 2006 amendments to French inheritance 
law, which expanded freedom of testation in a variety of ways.77 But even 
prior to the 2006 amendments, it was possible for a person to impede the 
protections provided by the réserve héréditaire. 
Prior to the enactment of the 2006 laws, there was a number of availa-
ble estate planning techniques that could significantly reduce the rights of 
the heirs. First, a testator could purchase a large life insurance policy and 
name whomever he wanted as a beneficiary.78 Life insurance is not treated 
as part of the estate for purposes of calculating the réserve héréditaire, 
therefore these amounts are not generally subject to claims by the chil-
dren.79 If, however, the amount of the insurance policy is excessively large 
in comparison to the rest of the estate, then it can be brought back into the 
estate. Though there is no hard line rule for determining what constitutes 
excessively large, a policy for 20 percent of the value of the estate is gener-
ally considered to be within the bounds of the law, and thus not excessively 
large.80 
Another way of limiting the children’s right to their réserve héréditaire 
was through the creation of a tontine. A tontine is a form of joint tenancy 
that can be created upon the initial purchase of real estate. If property is 
owned under a tontine, when one of the joint tenants dies, the surviving 
joint tenant (usually the spouse) receives the property outright, regardless of 
the existence of other heirs.81 
                                                                                                                           
 75 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) TRUSTS § 29. 
 76 Id. 
 77 See Godard, supra note 3, at 51–53. 
 78 CODE DES ASSURANCES [C. ASSUR.] art. L132-12 (Fr.). 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. 
 81 The tontine is treated under French law as un contrat à titre onéreux which means “a con-
tract in return for a payment,” as opposed to a gratuitous transfer. Therefore, it is not limited by 
the réserve. This construction is based on the idea of the aléas (hazard): when two people buy the 
property they don’t know who will ultimately benefit from it. It is assumed that each of them have 
approximately the same chance of surviving or, if that is not the case, then the one who is more 
likely to survive will pay a greater share of the price. Therefore, if when the deed is signed, the  
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Finally, a testator could protect his spouse by creating a usufruct inter-
est for the spouse in property that would otherwise be covered by the ré-
serve héréditaire.82 After setting up a usufruct interest, the decedent can 
pass his entire estate to his spouse by giving the quotité disponible—the 
disposable portion—outright to the spouse, and giving the rest to the spouse 
as a usufruct. The usufruct can be established either during life or at death.83 
The usufruct gives the spouse the right to use, and generate income from, 
the property for her life, and the children only receive the property after her 
death.84 The usufruct purports to protect the children’s réserve héréditaire, 
because they are still given bare title over the property upon the spouse’s 
death. But, because the surviving spouse is given the right to use the proper-
ty for her life, this can significantly undermine the value of the réserve hé-
réditaire. If the spouse is much younger than the decedent, then this type of 
planning can keep the children from enjoying the inheritance during their 
lives. 
In 2006, French inheritance law underwent significant transformation, 
the effect of which was to further increase freedom of testation and reduce 
protection for heirs.85 The most direct challenge to the réserve héréditaire 
was the adoption of a provision that allows an heir to enter into an agree-
ment during life to forego his or her statutory rights through the use of a 
renonciation anticipée à l’action en reduction.86 Arguably the children still 
receive some protection through the fact that their consent is required in 
order to deviate from the réserve héréditaire. But, it may prove to be psy-
chologically difficult for a child to oppose his parent’s wishes while the 
parent is still alive. As a result of this provision, a French testator is now 
able to dispose of a greater portion of his estate—even as much as the entire 
estate—as he chooses, knowing that the disposition cannot later be chal-
lenged. The creation of the ability of a child to renounce his réserve hé-
réditaire was intended to allow families more flexibility in dividing up in-
                                                                                                                           
hazard is not really present (for example when one of them is a much younger spouse who doesn’t 
pay a significant share of the price), then the contract can be deemed to be actually a gratuitous 
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SCHOENBLUM, MULTISTATE AND MULTINATIONAL ESTATE PLANNING 18-15 to -17 (2009). 
 83 C. CIV. arts. 579, 1094-1 (Fr.). 
 84 See id. arts. 578, 579, 582, 617, 1094-1. 
 85 Alexandra Braun, Testamentary Freedom and Its Restrictions in French and Italian Law: 
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heritances. For example, the increased flexibility of the renonciation an-
ticipée à l’action en reduction would allow a family to make additional 
transfers of property to children with special needs or to transfer a family 
business to the child that is most active in the operation of the business, 
without having to worry about these transfers being undone after death.87 
Although the provision was enacted for these particular narrow purposes, 
the statute is not drafted in a limited fashion. Therefore, as long as the testa-
tor can get the consent of his heirs during life, he can distribute his estate to 
whomever he wants.88 
In addition, French inheritance law was also modified to allow a dece-
dent to appoint someone to manage part or all of the estate for a limited pe-
riod of time, not to exceed five years, even though the assets that will be 
under this management are part of the forced share and are therefore sup-
posed to be distributed outright to the heirs.89 This provision is designed to 
address situations where the inheritance involves a complex asset, such as a 
business interest, or where there are minors among the heirs.90 This provi-
sion has been highly controversial, with some commentators expressing fear 
that the testator will be able to continue administering his property from the 
grave.91 
Finally, the 2006 amendments cut back the protections provided by the 
réserve héréditaire by limiting the nature of their remedy to monetary dam-
ages. Prior to the 2006 law, children who brought a successful réserve hé-
réditaire claim could recover the property itself.92 After 2006, the recipient 
has a choice of giving the child the property itself or the cash value of the 
property.93 This gives the decedent greater control over dispositions of par-
ticular items of real or personal property. 
CONCLUSION 
The United States and France take very different approaches to inher-
itance law. The United States starts with the individual and his right to con-
trol his property at death as he chooses. France starts with the family and 
the rights of children to receive a pro-rata share of their parents’ estates. 
                                                                                                                           
 87 Id.; Braun, supra note 85, at 70. 
 88 There are, however, rigorous requirements designed to ensure that the heirs do not give 
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And yet, despite these differences, and despite what might be suggested by 
de Tocqueville’s quote that opened this essay, the United States and France 
share many similar patterns of succession. 
What explains this result? 
First, both the United States and France have high rates of intestacy. 
This means that in both countries, the majority of individuals pass all of 
their property to their spouse and children, and the children divide their 
share evenly. 
Second, despite the rhetoric of freedom of testation in the United 
States, when testators in the United States do write wills, their pattern of 
distribution is very similar to that which is required under traditional French 
inheritance law. In particular, most testators distribute their property to their 
spouse and to their children in equal shares. The difference in distribution 
patterns is explained by the fact that married testators in the United States 
are most likely to defer giving property to their children until the death of 
their spouse. Although this might seem very different from French law, the 
availability of the usufruct under French law makes it easy for French testa-
tors to follow this same plan. 
Another apparent difference is that in the United States, although testa-
tors tend to provide equally for their children at death, it is not uncommon 
for testators to make uneven distributions by gift during life. This is particu-
larly likely to be the case when there is a child with special needs, or a 
family business in which only some children participate. Though here 
again, the adoption of the renonciation anticipée à l’action en reduction in 
France makes it possible for testators to do the same thing, provided they 
get consent from the other children. 
Third, when it comes to freedom of testation, the countries are a lot 
more similar than they initially appear. Surprisingly, French inheritance law 
might provide even greater protection than inheritance law in the United 
States. The reason for this is that the United States restricts freedom of tes-
tation in indirect ways, such as through the doctrines of undue influence and 
lack of mental capacity. These doctrines, however, are blunt tools that pro-
vide protection for all relatives—no matter how distantly related. Although 
French law provides explicit protections for children and spouses through 
the réserve héréditaire, to the extent that a person seeks to control his 
quotité disponible, the “disposable portion,” he is largely free to do as he 
pleases. 
Although these two systems appear to converge somewhat, there are 
still significant differences in how they allocate power between parents and 
children over the disposition of the parents’ estate. In the United States, 
children will have little recourse against a parent determined to disinherit 
them, provided the parent takes the steps necessary to avoid a will dispute. 
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In France, parents have little recourse against children determined to secure 
their inheritance. 
Moreover, these continuing differences reflect a strong devotion to dif-
ferent underlying values. In France, there remains an explicit cultural value 
that, absent unusual circumstances—like a special needs child or a family 
business—children should be treated equally. These values, underlying the 
power of the réserve héréditaire, continue to be embraced by the French 
people and will no doubt serve as a continued restraint on changes to 
French law. 
Similarly, in the United States, there remains a strong cultural value 
that individuals should have the power to control their property as they 
choose. Although this power may be more limited than it initially appears 
when it comes to uneven distribution among family members or providing 
for a non-family member in place of family members, it remains strong in 
terms of the ability of individuals to impose conditions on bequests, and 
most importantly when it comes to making charitable bequests. 
What explains this continuing embrace of competing values? In the 
end it may best be explained by à chacun son gout! 
 
  
 
